Informed preference consequentialism, contractarianism and libertarian paternalism: on Harsanyi, Rawls and Robert Sugden’s The Community of Advantage

Mozaffar Qizilbash1
1Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, England

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Abstract

Robert Sugden abandons certain central tenets of traditional welfare economics and recommends a contractarian alternative. He rejects ‘Libertarian Paternalism’ (LP) and related ‘paternalistic’ proposals. The seeds of ‘paternalism’ inspired by the findings of behavioural economics can be found in informed preference views associated with J.S. Mill and John Harsanyi. Nonetheless, those who endorse a combination of the informed preference view of welfare, consequentialism and welfarism—‘informed preference consequentialists’—have good reasons to resist the agenda of LP. John Rawls adopts a variation of the informed preference view. Contracting parties in his theory accept ‘paternalistic principles’. Sugden’s claim that contractarians cannot be ‘paternalists’ does not generalise to all contractarian theories. Sugden’s and Rawls’ contractarian positions are in important respects different.

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