Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization - Tập 144 - Trang 153-165 - 2017
Patrick W. Schmitz1,2
1University of Cologne, Germany
2CEPR, London, UK

Tài liệu tham khảo

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