Incentives, income sharing, and institutional innovation in the yugoslav self-managed firm

Aumann, 1959, Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games, Vol. IV, 287 Conner, 1976, The Legal Anatomy of a Yugoslav Enterprise, The Business Lawyer, 32, 99 Greenberg, 1975, Pure and Local Public Goods: A Game-Theoretic Approach Groves, 1977, Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the “Free Rider” Problem, Econometrica, 45, 783, 10.2307/1912672 Ichiishi, 1977, Coalition Structure in a Labor-Managed Economy, Econometrica, 45, 341, 10.2307/1911214 Kurz, 1977, Altruistic Equilibrium, 177 Leibenstein, 1974, Aspects of the X-efficiency Theory of the Firm, Bell. J. Econ., 5, 125 Meade, 1972, The Theory of Labour-Managed Firms and of Profit-Sharing, Econ. J., 82, 402, 10.2307/2229945 Miyazaki, 1979 Pejovich, 1973, The Banking System and the Investment Behavior of the Yugoslav Firm Steinherr, 1977, On the Efficiency of Profit Sharing and Labor Participation in Management, Bell J. Econ., 8, 545, 10.2307/3003303 Stiglitz, 1974, Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping, Rev. Econ. Stud., 41, 219, 10.2307/2296714 Stiglitz, 1975, Incentives, Risk and Information—Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy, Bell J. Econ., 6, 552, 10.2307/3003243 Vanek, 1971 Williamson, 1975