Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms

Games and Economic Behavior - Tập 95 - Trang 168-177 - 2016
Wonki Jo Cho1
1School of Economics, Sogang University, 35 Baekbeom-ro, Mapo-gu, Seoul 04107, South Korea

Tài liệu tham khảo

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