In defense of really statistical explanations

Synthese - Tập 200 - Trang 1-15 - 2022
Marc Lange1
1Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, USA

Tóm tắt

According to Lange (2013, 2017), ?Really Statistical (RS) explanations? constitute an important kind of non-causalscientific explanation. However, Roski (2021) has argued that all alleged RS explanations are either causalexplanations or not explanations at all. In so arguing, Roski has invoked Kahneman?s (2011) interpretation of onealleged RS explanation. I employ Roski?s arguments as an opportunity to elaborate and defend RS explanations. Iargue that ?RS explanations? genuinely explain rather than deny the presuppositions of why-questions. I argue thatthe RS model is not excessively permissive in allowing some explanations to work purely statistically rather than bydescribing causal relations. I argue that Roski?s view that some ?RS explanations? operate by describing causalrelations fails to capture the kind of explanatory insight that RS explanations provide. I elaborate the notion of a?characteristically statistical phenomenon? that figures in the RS model and thereby explain how an RS explanationreveals that its explanandum is independent of any causal facts or specific chances, but rather depends only on ageneric sort of arrangement of chances. Finally, I argue that Roski misinterprets Kahneman, who actually holds thatthe explanation he discusses is a non-causal explanation that nicely fits the RS model. RS explanations constitutean important kind of non-causal scientific explanation.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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