Import Diversion under European Antidumping Policy

Jozef Konings1, Hylke Vandenbussche1, Linda Springael2
1University of Leuven (KULeuven), Belgium and CEPR, London
2University of Antwerp, Belgium

Tóm tắt

This paper studies empirically the effects of European antidumping cases on trade diversion from importers “named” in an antidumping investigation, to countries “not named” in the investigation. For this purpose we use a unique data set at the 8-digit product level. The amount of import diversion can be regarded as an indication of the effectiveness of antidumping policy. We find that trade diversion in the European Union caused by antidumping actions—in contrast to the United States—is limited, suggesting that the European Union's antidumping policy is more effective in keeping imports out. This result holds even after controlling for selection bias in the antidumping investigation procedure. A number of explanations for this difference in trade diversion as a result of antidumping policy between the European Union and United States are formulated.

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