Implications of power: When the CEO can pressure the CFO to bias reports

Journal of Accounting and Economics - Tập 58 - Trang 117-141 - 2014
Henry L. Friedman1
1UCLA Anderson School of Management, 110 Westwood Plaza, D402 Cornell Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095, United States

Tài liệu tham khảo

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