Implications of a Discard Ban in Multispecies Quota Fisheries
Tóm tắt
We present an analysis of quota regulation and discarding in multispecies fisheries, explicitly taking into account the costs of non-compliance with quotas and a possible discard ban, as well as the costs of selective fishing (avoidance effort). We examine the impact of a discard ban on vessels’ profit maximising behaviour, in particular where species quotas are not set in proportion to their availability on the fishing grounds, considering both non-tradeable quotas and ITQs. We show the interdependence between penalty rates for both discards and over-quota landings in determining quota market outcomes. We find that quota prices are sensitive to penalty rates and to the presence of restrictive quotas for “choke” species.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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