How politics can influence the allocation of social program benefits: A case study of the Brazilian poverty reduction program Bolsa Família

Economic Analysis and Policy - Tập 80 - Trang 77-89 - 2023
Thiago L.S. Pinto1, Benjamin Miranda Tabak2, Daniel O. Cajueiro1,3,4
1Department of Economics, University of Brasilia, Campus Universitario Darcy Ribeiro - FACE, Brasilia, DF 70910-900, Brazil
2FGV/EPPG Escola de Políticas Públicas e Governo, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Distrito Federal, Brazil
3National Institute of Science and Technology for Complex Systems (INCT-SC), Brazil
4Machine Learning Laboratory in Finance and Organizations (LAMFO), Universidade de Brasília (UnB), 70910-900, Brasília, Brazil

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