How does reciprocal behaviour of workers influence the wage setting of unions?
Spanish Economic Review - 2008
Tóm tắt
Traditional wage setting models assume that unions maximise the total income of workers, whereas actually they should maximise worker utility. These models implicitly equate utility with income, but this is not valid if workers’ utility depends on their sense of fairness and includes a non-pecuniary benefit from work. This paper presents a model combining efficiency wages with bargaining theory, drawing inspiration from the gift-exchange approach by Akerlof [Q J Econ 97(4):543–569, 1982]. It shows that the mutual gift exchange between firms and workers generates a non-pecuniary benefit which contributes to the workers’ utility in a non-monotonic way depending on the strength of workers’ sense of fairness. The model shows that if an employment subsidy is paid to workers it generates more jobs than when paid to firms.
Từ khóa
Tài liệu tham khảo
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