Highly flexible neighborhood promotes efficient coordination: Experimental evidence

European Economic Review - Tập 129 - Trang 103521 - 2020
Yohanes E. Riyanto1, Tat-How Teh2
1Division of Economics, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
2Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, Singapore

Tài liệu tham khảo

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