Hard- and soft-line responses to Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument

Clarke, R. 1996: ‘Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action’, Philosophical Topics 24, 19–48.

Clarke, R. 2003: Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press.

Cuypers, S. E. 2004: ‘The Trouble With Harry. Compatibilist Free Will Internalism and Manipulation’, Journal of Philosophical Research 29, 235–54.

Cuypers, S. E. 2006: ‘The Trouble with Externalist Compatibilist Autonomy’, Philosophical Studies 129, 171–196.

Cuypers, S. E. and Haji, I. 2006: ‘Education for Critical Thinking: Can It Be Non-Indoctrinative?’, Educational Philosophy and Theory 38, 723–43.

Fischer, J. M. 2004: ‘Responsibility and Manipulation’, The Journal of Ethics 8, 145–77.

Fischer, J. M. 2006: ‘The Cards that are Dealt You’, The Journal of Ethics 10, 107–29.

Frankfurt, H. G. 1975: ‘Three Concepts of Free Action’, in H. G. Frankfurt 1988: The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 47–57.

Frankfurt, H. G. 2002: ‘Reply to John Martin Fischer’, in S. Buss and L. Overton, eds.: Contours of Agency. Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 27–31.

Glannon, W. 1998: ‘Moral Responsibility and Personal Identity’, American Philosophical Quarterly 35, 231–49.

Haji, I. 2000: ‘Death and Asymmetries in Moral Appraisals’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24, 135–50.

Haji, I. and Cuypers, S. E. 2001: ‘Libertarian Free Will and CNC Manipulation’, Dialectica 55, 221–38.

Haji, I. and Cuypers, S. E. 2007 (forthcoming): Magical Agents, Global Induction, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85.

McKenna, M. 2005a: ‘The Relationship between Autonomous and Morally Responsible Agency’, in J. S. Taylor, ed.: Personal Autonomy. New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 205–34.

McKenna, M. 2005b (forthcoming): ‘Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents: Why Mele’s Beth Might be Blameworthy’, Philosophical Topics 33.

McKenna, M. forthcoming: ‘A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Mele, A. R. 1995: Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy, New York: Oxford University Press.

Mele, A. R. 2005: ‘A critique of Pereboom’s “Four-Case Argument” for Incompatibilism’, Analysis 65: 75–80.

Mele, A. R. 2006: Free Will and Luck, New York: Oxford University Press.

O’Connor, T. 2000: Persons and Causes, New York: Oxford University Press.

Parfit, D. 1984: Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Pereboom, D. 1995: ‘Determinism Al Dente’, Nous 29, 21–45.

Pereboom, D. 2001: Living Without Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pereboom, D. 2002: ‘Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism’, in R. Kane, ed.: The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press, 477–88.

Pereboom, D. 2005: ‘Defending Hard Incompatibilism’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29, 228–47.

Zimmerman, D. 1999: ‘Born Yesterday: Personal Autonomy for Agents Without a Past’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, 236–66.

Zimmerman, M. J. forthcoming: ‘Moral Luck: A Partial Map’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy.