Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry

Axel Dreher1, Martin Gassebner2
1Alfred-Weber-Institute for Economics, Heidelberg University, Bergheimer Strasse 58, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany
2CESifo Munich, Germany

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