Generalized Nash equilibrium
Tóm tắt
For accep/reject games and coalitionless games, the classical Roos-Nash equilibrium is generalized to a so-called strongly dependent equilibrium, which exists for a wider class of games than the classical equilibrium. The following hierarchical chain of progressively stronger equilibria is established: symmetrical activeA-equilibrium, strongly dependent equilibrium, symmetricalB-equilibrium, Roos-Nash classical dependent equilibrium. The first three of these have been proposed by the author as weaker versions of the classical coalitionless equilibrium.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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