Lý thuyết trò chơi và các liên minh chính trị ở Pháp năm 1951
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#hệ thống bầu cử #lý thuyết trò chơi #đảng chính trị #liên minh #cuộc bầu cử quốc hội Pháp 1951Tài liệu tham khảo
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Balinski, M.L., andH.P. Young: The Quota Method of Apportionment. American Mathematical Monthly82, 1975, 701–29.
Billera, L.J.: Existence of General Bargaining Sets for Cooperative Games Without Side Payments. Bulletin of the American Mathematics Society76, 1970, 375–379.
De Swaan, A.: Coalition Theory and Cabinet Formations. San Francisco 1973.
Friend. K., J.D. Laing, andR.J. Morrison: Game Theoretic Analyses of Coalition Behavior. Theory and Decision 8, 1977, 127–157.
Hildebrand. D.K., J.D. Laing andH. Rosenthal: Prediction Analysis of Cross Classifications. New York 1977.
Luce.R.D., andA.A. Rogow: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Congressional Power Distribution for a Stable Two-Party System. Behavioral Science1, 1956, 83–95.
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McKelvey. R.D., andH. Rosenthal: Coalition Formation, Policy Distance, and the Theory of Games Without Sidepayments: An Application to the French Apparentement System. Game Theory and Political Science. Ed. by P.C. Ordeshook. New York 1978, 405–450.
Ministère de l'Intérieur: Les Elections Législatives du 17 Juin 1951. Paris 1953.
Peleg, B.: Bargaining Sets of Cooperative Games Without Sidepayments. Israel Journal of Mathematics1. 1963, 197–200.
Riker, W.: Bargaining in a Three-Person Game. American Political Science Review61, 1967, 642–656.
Riker, W., andP.C. Ordeshook: An Introduction ot Positive Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1973.
Rosenthal, H.: Simulating Elections in Western Democracies. Simulation in the Study of Politics. Ed. by W. Coplin. Chicago 1968.
-: Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bloc Voting Under Proportional Representation: Really Sophisticated Voting in French Labor Elections. Public Choice16, 1974.
-: Viability. Preferences and Coalitions in the French Election 1951. Public Choice18, 1975.