Game theory and global environmental policy

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Carraro C (ed) (2003) The endogenous formation of economic coalitions. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

Dasgupta P (2001) Human well-being and the natural environment. Oxford Press, Oxford

Dijkstra BR (1999) The political economy of environmental policy. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

Dixit A, Skeath S (1999) Games of strategy. Norton, New York

Endres A (1997) Negotiating a climate convention – the role of prices and quantities. Int Rev Law Econ 17:201–224

Endres A (2000) Umweltökonomie. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart

Endres A, Finus M (2002) Quotas may beat taxes in a global emission game. Int Tax Public Finan 9:687–707

Endres A, Finus M, Lobigs F (2000) Symbolische Umweltpolitik im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 1:72–91

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Endres A, Ohl C (2002) Introducing “cooperative push”: how inefficient environmental policy (sometimes!) protects the global commons better. Public Choice 111:285–302

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Finus M (2001) Game theory and international environmental cooperation. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

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Gigerenzer G, Selten R (2001) Bounded rationality. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass

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Rubinstein A (1998) Modelling bounded rationality. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass

Russell CS (2001) Applying economics to the environment. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Schmidt C (2000) International environmental agreements. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

Schulze GG, Ursprung HW (eds) (2001) International environmental problems. Oxford University Press, Oxford

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