Fitness: static or dynamic?
Tóm tắt
The most consistent definition of fitness makes it a static property of organisms. However, this is not how fitness is used in many evolutionary models. In those models, fitness is permitted to vary with an organism’s circumstances. According to this second conception, fitness is dynamic. There is consequently tension between these two conceptions of fitness. One recently proposed solution suggests resorting to conditional properties. We argue, however, that this solution is unsatisfactory. Using a very simple model, we show that it can lead to incompatible fitness values and indecision about whether selection actually occurs.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Abrams, M. (2007). Fitness and Propensity’s annulment? Biology and Philosophy, 22, 115–130.
Abrams, M. (2009a). Fitness ‘Kinematics’: Biological Function, Altruism, and Organism–Environment Development. Biology and Philosophy, 24, 487–504.
Abrams, M. (2009b). What determines biological fitness? The problem of the reference environment. Synthese, 166, 21–40.
Abrams, M. (2012). Measured, modeled, and causal conceptions of fitness. Frontiers in Genetics, 3, 196.
Abrams, M. (2013). Populations and pigeons: Prosaic pluralism about evolutionary causes. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 44, 294–301.
Abrams, M. (2014). Environmental grain, organism fitness, and type fitness. In G. Barker, E. Dejardins, & T. Pearce (Eds.), Entangled life: Organism and environment in the biological and social sciences. Springer.
Ariew, A., & Ernst, Z. (2009). What fitness Can’t be. Erkenntnis, 71(3), 289–301.
Ariew, A., & Lewontin, R. C. (2004). The confusions of fitness. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55(2), 347–363.
Beatty, J.H. and Finsen S.K. (1989). Rethinking the Propensity Interpretation: A Peek inside Pandora’s Box, in What the Philosophy of Biology Is: Essays Dedicated to David Hull, ed. Michael Ruse (Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishers), pp. 17–30.
Bouchard, F., & Rosenberg, A. (2004). Fitness, probability and the principles of natural selection. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55, 693–712.
Bourrat, P. (2015). Distinguishing natural selection from other evolutionary processes in the evolution of altruism. Biological Theory, 10, 311–321.
Bourrat, P. (2017). Explaining drift from a deterministic setting. Biological Theory, 12, 27–38.
Bourrat, P 2019. Natural selection and the reference grain problem”. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2019.03.003
Bourrat, P 2021. Facts, conventions, and the levels of selection. Elements in the Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108885812
Brandon, R. N. (1978). Adaptation and evolutionary theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 9, 181–206.
Brandon, R. N. (1990). Adaptation and environment. Princeton University Press.
Brandon, R. N. (2005). The difference between selection and drift: A reply to Millstein. Biology and Philosophy, 20, 153–170.
Brandon, R. N., & Beatty, J. H. (1984). The propensity interpretation of ‘fitness’—No interpretation is no substitute. Philosophy of Science, 51, 342–347.
Charbonneau, M., & Bourrat, P. (2021). Fidelity and the grain problem in cultural evolution. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03047-1
Doulcier, G., Takacs, P., & Bourrat, P. (2021). Taming fitness: Organism-environment interdependencies preclude long-term fitness forecasting. BioEssays, 43, 2000157.
Gillespie, J. H. (1977). Natural selection for variances in offspring numbers: A new evolutionary principle. American Naturalist, 111, 1010–1014.
Glymour, B. (1999). Population level causation and a unified theory of natural selection. Biology and Philosophy, 14, 521–536.
Hájek, A. (2003). Conditional probability is the very guide of life. In Probability is the very guide of life: The philosophical uses of chance, edited by Kyburg Jr, E. Henry, and Mariam Thalos, 183–203. Open Court,
Hájek, A. (2007). The reference class problem is your problem too. Synthese, 156, 563–585.
Kitcher, P., Sterelny, K., & Waters, C. K. (1990). The illusory riches of Sober’s monism. The Journal of Philosophy, 87, 158.
Kokko, H., Griffith, S. C., & Pryke, S. R. (2014). The hawk–dove game in a sexually reproducing species explains a colourful polymorphism of an endangered bird. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 281, 20141794.
Levins, R. (1968). Evolution in changing environments: Some theoretical explorations. Princeton University Press.
Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press.
Metz, J. A. J., Nisbet, R. M., & Geritz, S. A. H. (1992). How should we define ‘fitness’ for general ecological scenarios? Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 7, 198–202.
Mills, S. K., & Beatty, J. H. (1979). The propensity interpretation of fitness. Philosophy of Science, 46, 263–286.
Millstein, R. (2016). Probability in biology: The case of fitness. In A. Hájek & C. R. Hitchcock (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of probability and philosophy (pp. 601–622). Oxford University Press.
Otsuka, J. (2016). A critical review of the Statisticalist debate. Biology and Philosophy, 31, 459–482.
Otsuka, J., Turner, T., Allen, C., & Lloyd, E. A. (2011). Why the causal view of fitness survives. Philosophy of Science, 78, 209–224.
Pence, C. H., & Ramsey, G. (2013). A new Foundation for the Propensity Interpretation of fitness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64, 851–881.
Pence, C. H., & Ramsey, G. (2015). Is organismic fitness at the basis of evolutionary theory? Philosophy of Science, 82, 1081–1091.
Ramsey, G. (2006). Block fitness. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 37, 484–498.
Ridley, M. (1996). Evolution (2nd edition). Blackwell.
Rosenberg, A. (1982). On the propensity definition of fitness. Philosophy of Science, 49, 268–273.
Rosenberg, A. (1983). Fitness. Journal of Philosophy, 80, 457–473.
Rosenberg, Alexander and Frédéric Bouchard. 2015. “Fitness,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/fitness/>
Rosenberg, A., & Williams, M. B. (1986). Fitness as primitive and propensity. Philosophy of Science, 53, 412–418.
Scriven, M. (1959). Explanation and prediction in evolutionary theory: Satisfactory explanation of the past is possible even when prediction of the future is impossible. Science, 130, 477–482.
Sober, E. (1984). The nature of selection: Evolutionary theory in philosophical focus. University of Chicago Press.
Sober, E. (2001). The two faces of fitness. In R. S. Singh, C. B. Krimbas, D. B. Paul, & J. H. Beatty (Eds.), Thinking about evolution: Historical, philosophical, and political perspectives (pp. 309–321). Cambridge University Press.
Sober, E. (2011). Realism, conventionalism, and causal decomposition in units of selection: Reflections on Samir Okasha’s evolution and the levels of selection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82(1), 221–231.
Sober, E. (2013). Trait fitness is not a propensity, but fitness variation is. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 44(3), 336–341.
Stevens, Lori. 2011. “Selection: Frequency-dependent,” in eLS (Wiley Online Library). https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470015902.a0001763.pub2
Tuljapurkar, Shripad. 2013. Population dynamics in variable environments (2nd edition). Springer: Berlin Heidelberg.
Wagner, G. P. (2010). The measurement theory of fitness. Evolution, 64–65, 1358–1376. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.2009.00909.x
Walsh, D. M. (2007). The pomp of superfluous causes: The interpretation of evolutionary theory. Philosophy of Science, 74(3), 281–303.
Walsh, D. M. (2010). Not a sure thing: Fitness, probability, and causation. Philosophy of Science, 77, 147–171.
Waters, K. C. (2011). Okasha’s unintended argument for toolbox theorizing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82, 232–240.
Walsh, D.M., Ariew, A., and Matthen, M. (2017). Four Pillars of Statisticalism, Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology, vol. 9, no. 1, https://doi.org/10.3998/ptb.6959004.0009.001
Williams, M. B. (1970). Deducing the consequences of evolution: A mathematical model. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 29, 343–385.