Fiscal forward guidance: A case for selective transparency

Journal of Monetary Economics - Tập 116 - Trang 236-248 - 2020
Ippei Fujiwara1,2, Yuichiro Waki3,4
1Faculty of Economics, Keio University and ABFER, Tokyo, Japan
2Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
3School of Economics, The University of Queensland, Australia
4Faculty of Economics, Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan

Tài liệu tham khảo

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