Exchange-stability in roommate problems

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 23 Số 1-2 - Trang 3-12 - 2019
Azar Abizada1
1School of Business, ADA University, Baku, Azerbaijan

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Tài liệu tham khảo

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