Excess perks and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

Journal of Corporate Finance - Tập 25 - Trang 419-434 - 2014
Nianhang Xu1, Xiaorong Li2, Qingbo Yuan3, Kam C. Chan4
1School of Business, Renmin University of China, Beijing, 100872, China
2School of Public Finance,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China)
3Department of Accounting, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC 3010, Australia
4Gordon Ford College of Business, Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green, KY 42101, Kentucky, United States

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