Evolutionary Coalitional Games
Tóm tắt
We introduce the concept of evolutionary coalitional games played in a large population. The members of the population play a strategy chosen from a finite set and interact in randomly formed coalitions. The interactions are described by a multiplayer strategic game. Each coalition generates a total utility, identified with the value of the coalition, and equal to the sum of the payoffs of its all members from the multiplayer game. The total utility is distributed among the coalition members, proportionally to their Shapley values. Evolution of the whole population is governed by the replicator equations. Polymorphic stationary states of the population are studied for various types of the multiplayer social dilemma games. It is argued that application of coalitional game theory solution concepts to social dilemma models of evolutionary game theory can foster cooperation in the long run.
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