Essential stability of cooperative equilibria for population games
Tóm tắt
In this paper, we first introduce the notion of cooperative equilibria for population games and prove its existence theorem by Proposition 2 in Kajii (J Econ Theory 56:194–205, 1992). We next identify a residual dense subclass of population games whose cooperative equilibria are all essential. Moreover, we show the existence of essential components of the cooperative equilibrium set by proving the connectivity of minimal essential sets of the cooperative equilibrium set.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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