Equilibria analysis in social dilemma games with Skinnerian agents

Mind & Society - Tập 12 - Trang 219-233 - 2013
Ugo Merlone1, Daren R. Sandbank2, Ferenc Szidarovszky3
1Psychology Department, University of Torino, Turin, Italy
2Systems and Industrial Engineering Department, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA
3Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary

Tóm tắt

Different disciplines have analyzed binary choices to model collective behavior in human systems. Several situations in which social dilemma arise can be modeled as N-person prisoner’s dilemma games including homeland security, public goods, international political economy among others. The purpose of this study is to develop an analytical solution to the N-person prisoner’s dilemma game when boundedly rational agents interact in a population. Previous studies in the literature consider the case in which cooperators and defectors have the same learning factors. We obtain an analytical equation to find equilibria in the N-person prisoner’s dilemma game in the general case when agents have different learning factors. We also introduce a more realistic approach where probability values are bounded between zero and one and therefore eliminates the possibility of infeasible probability values. Since no analytic solution can be derived in this case, agent based simulation is used to analyze the asymptotic behavior of the resulted dynamical system.

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