Epistemic Relativism, Probability, and Forms of Subjectivity
Tóm tắt
In this article, the epistemological interpretation of the relationship between concepts of relativism, beliefs, and probability ensures a defense of two theses, namely, (i) epistemic relativism refers to attitudes that depend on the repetition and anchoring of probabilistic beliefs, and (ii) Popper’s propensity interpretation of probability discloses the connections between relativity, probability, and collective subjectivity. The propensity interpretation brings a framework for describing the role of collective subjectivity in epistemic systems. This approach, as an acceptable epistemological stance, is related to the variability of anchored collective beliefs. The repetition and anchoring of subjective probabilistic beliefs becomes a relative reference frame for evaluating the elements of knowledge. With this in mind, each particular way of considering probability indicates a manner of distinguishing epistemic systems. In epistemic systems, the statements are collective points of view expressed in the form ‘p is justified when belief in p is probably reliable.’ The statements can be accurate in a particular epistemic system but inaccurate in other systems. As a result, by avoiding the ‘all statements must be true or false’ requirement, each proponent of a certain epistemic system can build a probabilistic picture of the world. In this picture, not every statement needs to be ‘true’ when and if the statement expresses a collective point of view that has a propensity to be reliable and justified.
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