Entrepreneurship in autocratic regimes – how neo-patrimonialism constrains innovation
Tóm tắt
Autocratic regimes form an institutional environment for entrepreneurship that differs substantially from those in democratic capitalist societies. In general, democracy guarantees equality before the law. According to Hayek, the rule of law protects property rights rather than profits of established firms. Innovative outsiders can thereby challenge incumbents, which is a legal requirement for creative destruction. In autocratic regimes, by contrast, political power is interlaced with the command of economic resources. Entrepreneurship faces political constraints defined by economic interests of political powerholders who are typically, either directly or indirectly, also engaged in economic activities. The paper analyzes how autocratic political systems subordinate the economy in order to create rents and maintain power. The (neo-) Weberian conception of neo-patrimonialism is transferred and used as an analytical tool to describe the institutional environment for market activities. The paper places an emphasis on post-communist transition economies and demonstrates the institutional lock-in effect that makes the market economy dependent on political power. The deliberate coexistence of legal norms and arbitrariness in neo-patrimonial regimes institutionalizes uncertainty in particular. A typology of entrepreneurial adjustments to institutions of the neo-patrimonial order is discussed. Most of them will impede economic dynamism.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Acemoglu D, Robinson JA (2012) Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Crown, New York
Albrecht H, Frankenberger R (2010) Autoritarismus Reloaded: Konzeptionelle Anmerkungen zur Vergleichenden Analyse politischer Systeme. In: Albrecht H. Frankenberger R. (eds) Autoritarismus Reloaded: Neuere Ansätze und Erkenntnisse der Autokratieforschung. Baden-Baden: Nomos
Baumol WJ (1990) Entrepreneurship: productive, unproductive, and destructive. J Pol Econ 98:893–921
Becker SO, Boeckh K, Hainz C, Woessmann L (2016) The empire is dead, long live the empire! Long-run persistence of trust and corruption in the bureaucracy. EJ 126(590):40–74
Boch R (2004) Staat und Wirtschaft im. Jahrhundert. Oldenburg, München
Christophe B (2005) Metamorphosen des Leviathan in einer post-sozialistischen Gesellschaft. Georgiens Provinz zwischen Fassaden der Anarchie und regulativer Allmacht. transcript Verlag, Bielfeld
Coyne C, Leeson P (2004) The plight of underdeveloped countries. Cato J 24:235–249
Deecke K (2015) Staatswirtschaft vom Himmel herabgeholt. Konzeptionen liberaler Wirtschaftspolitik in Universität und Verwaltung 1785-1845: Ausprägungen und Brechungen am Beispiel Ostpreußens und Vorpommerns. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M.
Douhan R, Henrekson M (2010) Entrepreneurship and second-best institutions: going beyond Baumol’s typology. J Evol Econ 20:629–643
Eich U (1984) Herrschaft im zaristischen Russland. Saeculum 35:152–166
Eisenstadt SN (1973) Traditional patrimonialism and modern neopatrimonialism. Sage, London
Elert N, Henrekson M (2016) Evasive entrepreneurship. Small Bus Econ 47:95–113
Elert N, Henrekson M (2017) Entrepreneurship and Institutions: A Bidirectional Relationship. IFN Working Paper no. 1153. Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm
Eucken W (1932) Staatliche Strukturwandlungen und die Krisis des Kapitalismus. Rev World Econ 36:297–321
Friedman M (2002) Capitalism and freedom: fortieth, Anniversary edn. Chicago University Press, Chicago and London
Grosfeld I, Zhuravskaya E (2015) Cultural vs. economic legacies of empires: evidence from the partition of Poland. J Comp Econ 43:55–75
Hall P, Soskice D (eds) (2001) Varieties of capitalism: the institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Harris R (2000) Industrializing English law: entrepreneurship and business organization 1720–1844. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Hayek FAv (1969) Grundsätze einer liberalen Gesellschaftsordnung. In: Studien F (ed) Hayek FAv. Mohr, Tübingen
Hayek FAv (1982/1993) Law, legislation and liberty: a new statement of the Liberal principles of justice and political economy. Volume I: rules and order. Routledge, London
Hellman J, Jones G, Kaufmann D (2000) Seize the state, seize the day: state capture, corruption, and influence in transition, World Bank policy research paper 2444. World Bank Institute, Washington D.C
Hensell S (2009) Die Willkür des Staates: Herrschaft und Verwaltung in Osteuropa. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden
Higgs R (1997) Regime uncertainty: why the great depression lasted so long and why prosperity resumed after the war. Indep Rev 1:561–590
Kirzner I (1973) Competition & entrepreneurship. Chicago University Press, Chicago
Kischel U (2015) Rechtsvergleichung. Beck, München
Kluge J (2015) Foreign direct investment, political risk and the limited access order. New Political Econ 22(1):109–127
McCloskey D (2016) Bourgeois equality: how ideas, not capital or institutions, enriched the world. Chicago University Press, Chicago
Nazrullaeva E, Baranov A, Yakovlev A (2013) Criminal Persecution of Business in Russia’s Regions: Private Interests vs. “Stick” System, Working Paper of the Institute of Industrial and Market Studies. Higher School of Economics, Moscow
North DC (1990) Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press, New York
North DC, Wallis JJ, Weingast BR (2009) Violence and social orders: a conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
OECD (2005a) The informal economy in Albania. Analysis and policy recommendations. Report prepared by the OECD – investment compact for the. Ministry of Economy of Albania, Paris
OECD (2005b) Fighting corruption in transition economies: Georgia. OECD, Paris
Olson M (2000) Power and prosperity: outgrowing communists and capitalist dictatorships. Basic Books, New York
Schumpeter J (1911/1987) Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung: Eine Untersuchung über Unternehmergewinn, Kapital, Kredit, Zins und den Konjunkturzyklus. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin
Seo M, Creed D (2002) Institutional contradictions, praxis, and institutional change: a dialectical perspective. Acad Manag Rev 27:222–247
Stefes C (2006) Understanding post-soviet transitions: corruption, collusion and Clientelism. Palgrave macmillan, Houndsmill
Stykow P (2010) Bunte Revolutionen: Durchbruch zur Demokratie oder Modus der autoritären Systemreproduktion? Politische Vierteljahresschrift 51:137–162
Timm C (2010) Jenseits von Demokratiehoffnung und Autoritarismusverdacht: Eine herrschaftssoziologische Analyse posttransformatorischer Regime. In: Albrecht H, Frankenberger R (eds) Autoritarismus reloaded: Neue Ansätze und Erkenntnisse in der Autokratieforschung. Nomos, Baden-Baden
Timm C (2012) Institutional uncertainty and economic development. Unpublished Manuscript Humboldt University, Berlin
Weber M (1985) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie, 5th edn. Mohr, Tübingen
Wegner G (2016) Institutionenökonomische Narrative für die Entstehung des Kapitalismus: eine konstruktive Kritik und das Beispiel Preußens. In: Caspari V (ed) Studien zur Entwicklung der ökonomischen Theorie. Dunker & Humblot, Berlin
Wegner G, Heinrich-Mechergui M, Mechergui T (2013) Limited access order in Tunisia: elements of a political economy of autocratic regimes. Public Admin 36(11):743–753
Xu C (2011) The fundamental institutions of China’s reforms and development. J Econ Lit 49:1076–1151
Yakovlev A (2013) Russian modernization: between the need for new players and the fear of losing control of rent resources. J Euras. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2013.09.004
Zimmer K (2005) Klientelismus im neopatrimonialen Staat. Osteuropa 55(10):59–73