End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization - Tập 7 Số 1 - Trang 47-70 - 1986
Reinhard Selten1, Rolf Stoecker1
1University of Bonn, D-5300 Bonn 1, FRG

Tóm tắt

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

Axelrod, 1984

Bush, 1955

Kendall, 1948

Kreps, 1982, Reputation and imperfect information, Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 253, 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8

Kreps, 1982, Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 245, 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1

Lave, 1965, Factors affecting cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, Behavioral Science, 10, 26, 10.1002/bs.3830100104

Milgrom, 1982, Predation, reputation and entry deterrence, Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 280, 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-X

Morehous, 1967, One-play, two-play, five-play and ten-play runs of Prisoner's Dilemma, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11, 354

Rapoport, 1967, The ‘end’ and ‘start’ effects in interated Prisoner's Dilemma, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11, 354

Restle, 1970

Selten, 1978, The chain store paradox, Theory and Decision, 9, 127, 10.1007/BF00131770

Siegel, 1956

Stoecker, 1980

Stoecker, 1983, Das elernte Schluβverhalten — eine experimentelle Untersuchung, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 100