Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation

Games and Economic Behavior - Tập 140 - Trang 296-315 - 2023
Anqi Li1, Lin Hu2
1Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 3126 Pamplin Hall, Blacksburg, VA 24060, United States
2Research School of Finance, Actuarial Studies and Statistics, Australian National University, CBE Building 26C Kingsley Street, Canberra, ACT, 0200, Australia

Tài liệu tham khảo

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