Quy định bầu cử, Cấu trúc xã hội và Việc cung cấp hàng hóa công: Kết quả, Chi tiêu và Chính sách

Studies in Comparative International Development - Tập 56 - Trang 384-411 - 2021
Joel Sawat Selway1
1Brigham Young University, Provo, USA

Tóm tắt

Quyền đại diện tỷ lệ (PR) có dẫn đến việc chi tiêu cho hàng hóa công mở rộng hơn không? Tài liệu trước đây đã cho thấy điều này một cách áp đảo, nhưng các thực nghiệm hỗ trợ các phát hiện này chủ yếu dựa trên các quốc gia phương Tây đồng nhất về dân tộc. Phân loại các quốc gia theo ba chiều về cấu trúc dân tộc—sự phân mảnh dân tộc, sự chồng chéo thu nhập dân tộc và sự phân tán địa lý dân tộc—tôi lập luận rằng trong một số loại xã hội, PR có tác động tích cực đến loại chi tiêu tài chính như đã được dự đoán bởi các mô hình trước, nhưng không ở những nơi khác. Cụ thể, ở những quốc gia có sự nổi bật dân tộc cao (đa dạng dân tộc, ít chồng chéo) nơi các nhóm dân tộc bị trộn lẫn về mặt địa lý, PR dẫn đến việc chi tiêu tài chính hẹp hơn; trong các xã hội có sự nổi bật dân tộc cao nơi các nhóm sắc tộc bị cô lập về mặt địa lý, cả PR và các quy tắc bầu cử đa số đều không dẫn đến việc chi tiêu tài chính mở rộng hơn. Tôi kiểm tra lý thuyết xã hội - thể chế này trong một mẫu gồm 70 nền dân chủ đang phát triển, sử dụng tuổi thọ và tỷ lệ mù chữ như những đại diện cho việc cung cấp hàng hóa công.

Từ khóa

#Quyền đại diện tỷ lệ #chi tiêu hàng hóa công #cấu trúc xã hội #nghiên cứu so sánh #dân chủ đang phát triển

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