Efficient assignment respecting priorities

Journal of Economic Theory - Tập 145 - Trang 1269-1282 - 2010
Lars Ehlers1, Aytek Erdil2
1Département de Sciences Économiques and CIREQ, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128 Succursale Centre Ville, Montréal, Québec H3C 3J7, Canada
2Department of Economics, Oxford University, Nuffield College, New Road, OX1 1NF, Oxford, UK

Tài liệu tham khảo

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