Effects of Law-Enforcement Efficiency and Duration of Trials in an Oligopolistic Competition Among Fair and Unfair Firms
Tóm tắt
Building on differential game theory involving asymmetric agents, an oligopoly game between two distinct groups of firms is analyzed and solved under open-loop information. One group develops Research & Development to reduce its marginal production costs and behaves fairly, whereas the other one violates intellectual property rights of the rival, using the stolen technology to reduce its own marginal costs. We investigate the effects of law enforcement in this setup, by discussing the appropriate fine to be determined and the profitability of unfair behavior. Finally, we assess how the duration of related trials can affect efficiency of enforcement policy.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Parish, J.: The Verge Editors: Apple vs. Samsung: The Complete Lawsuit Timeline. Vox Media, Washington (2011)
Centocor Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories.: 10–1144, US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Washington) (2009)
Centocor Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories.: 07cv139, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Texas (Marshall) (2011)
Anton, J.J., Yao, D.A.: Finding lost profits: an equilibrium analysis of patent infringement damages. J. Law Econ. Organ. 23(1), 186–207 (2007)
Belleflamme, P., Picard, P.M.: Piracy and competition. J. Econ. Manage. Strat. 16(2), 351–383 (2007)
Lu, Y., Poddar, S.: Accommodation or deterrence in the face of commercial piracy: the impact of intellectual property rights protection. Oxf. Econ. Pap. 64(3), 518–538 (2012)
Ménière, Y., Parlane, S.: Innovation in the shadow of patent litigation. Rev. Ind. Organ. 32(2), 95–111 (2008)
Motchenkova, E.: Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 189(1), 269–291 (2008)
Kort, P.M., Motchenkova, E.: Analysis of current penalty schemes for violation of antitrust laws. J. Optim. Theory Appl. 128(2), 431–451 (2006)
Katsoulacos, Y., Ulph, D.: Antitrust penalties and the implications of empirical evidence on cartel overcharges. Econ. J. 123(572), F558–F581 (2013)
Crampes, C., Langinier, C.: Litigation and settlement in patent infringement cases. Rand J. Econ. 33(3), 258–274 (2002)
Warshofsky, F.: The Patent Wars. Wiley, New York (1994)
Schankerman, M., Scotchmer, S.: Damages and injunctions in protecting intellectual property. Rand J. Econ. 32(4), 199–220 (2001)
Cellini, R., Lambertini, L.: R&D incentives and market structure: dynamic analysis. J. Optim. Theory Appl. 126(1), 85–96 (2005)
Cellini, R., Lambertini, L.: Dynamic R&D with spillovers: competition vs cooperation. J. Econ. Dyn. Control 33(3), 568–582 (2009)
d’Aspremont, C., Jacquemin, A.: Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers. Am. Econ. Rev. 78, 1133–1137 (1988)
Dockner, E.J., Jørgensen, S., Long, N.V., Sorger, G.: Differential Games in Economics and Management Science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2000)
Hinloopen, J., Smrkolj, G., Wagener, F.: From mind to market: a global, dynamic analysis of R&D. J. Econ. Dyn. Control 37(12), 2729–2754 (2013)
Hinloopen, J., Smrkolj, G., Wagener, F.: In defense of trusts: R&D cooperation in global perspective. J. Labor Econ. 33(2), 269–296 (2015)
Smrkolj, G., Wagener, F.: Research among copycats: R&D, spillovers, and feedback strategies. J. Labor Econ. 33(2), 269–296 (2015)
Lambertini, L., Mantovani, A.: Process and product innovation by a multiproduct monopolist: a dynamic approach. Int. J. Ind. Organ. 27(4), 508–518 (2009)
Benkard, C.L.: A dynamical analysis of the market for wide-bodied commercial aircraft. Rev. Econ. Stud. 71(3), 581–611 (2000)
Besanko, D., Doraszelski, U., Kryukov, Y., Satterthwaite, M.: Learning-by-doing, organizational forgetting, and industry dynamics. Econometrica 78(2), 453–508 (2010)
Hasnas, I., Lambertini, L., Palestini, A.: Open innovation in a dynamic Cournot duopoly. Econ. Model. 36, 79–87 (2014)
Parr, R.: Royalty Rates for Licensing Intellectual Property. Wiley, Hoboken (2012)
Dhillon, A., Rigolini, J.: Development and the interaction of enforcement institutions. J. Public Econ. 95(1), 79–87 (2011)