Quản lý lợi nhuận và phản ứng của thị trường chứng khoán đối với Đạo luật Sarbanes-Oxley dựa trên biện pháp chiến lược cạnh tranh

Review of Accounting and Finance - Tập 10 Số 4 - Trang 368-384 - 2011
Kenneth J.Hunsader1, GwendolynPennywell1
1Mitchell College of Business, University of South Alabama, Mobile, Alabama, USA

Tóm tắt

Mục đíchKiến thức thông thường cho rằng các doanh nghiệp quản lý lợi nhuận để tối đa hóa tài sản của nhà quản lý, giá trị của doanh nghiệp và/hoặc lượng thông tin trên thị trường. Mục đích của bài báo này là cung cấp một lời giải thích bổ sung.Thiết kế/phương pháp/cách tiếp cậnSử dụng các công ty trong chỉ số Standard & Poor's 500 và bảng xếp hạng công bố báo cáo hàng năm, các tác giả đã sử dụng kiểm định t tiêu chuẩn để kiểm tra sự khác biệt về công bố dựa trên một thước đo chiến lược cạnh tranh (CSM). CSM phân loại các đối thủ trong ngành thành các bổ sung hoặc thay thế chiến lược. Các tác giả cũng kiểm tra sự khác biệt trong việc quản lý lợi nhuận bằng cách sử dụng các khoản tích lũy tùy ý và áp dụng phương pháp nghiên cứu sự kiện để xem xét phản ứng của lợi nhuận cổ phiếu đối với Đạo luật Sarbanes-Oxley.

Từ khóa

#Quản lý lợi nhuận #Đạo luật Sarbanes-Oxley #Chiến lược cạnh tranh #Thị trường chứng khoán #Các khoản tích lũy tùy ý

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