Does the IMF cause civil war? A comment
Tóm tắt
The global economic downturn has heightened concerns about intervention by global financial institutions and political stability. One prominently-published article purports to show that signing on to an IMF structural adjustment program (SAP) increases the risk of civil war, Hartzell et al. (International Organization 64:339–56, 2010). The authors claim that IMF SAPs push liberalization, which hurts people badly enough that they foment civil war. We advance the debate by critically examining their theoretical and empirical evidence, particularly questioning their crucial assumptions about the impact of IMF programs on the economic environment in terms of who actually wins and loses from liberalization and who might be in a position to rebel. Using their data, we find that signing on to an IMF program predicts the onset of a civil war negatively if one uses a lower threshold of 25 deaths when defining civil war. These results suggest that the operationalization of the IMF variable as well as the use of large-scale civil war (1,000 deaths and above) simply capture the effect of ongoing conflict rather than the effects of liberalization. After extending the time period under study and making only minor changes to operationalization, we find that at no time does IMF involvement successfully predict the onset of a civil war.
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