Does Scientific Progress Consist in Increasing Knowledge or Understanding?

Seungbae Park1
1Division of General Studies, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, Ulju-gun, Ulsan, Republic of Korea

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Tài liệu tham khảo

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