Do health insurers use target marketing as a tool for risk selection? Evidence from the Netherlands

Health Policy - Tập 126 - Trang 122-128 - 2022
Karel C.F. Stolper1, Lieke H.H.M. Boonen2, Frederik T. Schut1, Marco Varkevisser1
1Erasmus School of Health Policy & Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, the Netherlands
2Equalis, Jaarbeursplein 6, 3521 AL Utrecht, the Netherlands

Tài liệu tham khảo

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