Nội dung được dịch bởi AI, chỉ mang tính chất tham khảo
Những việc tốt có làm người xấu hơn không?
Tóm tắt
Theo hiệu ứng ‘cấp phép tự thân’, việc cam kết thực hiện một hành động tốt trong một lựa chọn trước đó có thể dẫn đến hành vi kém tốt hơn trong quyết định tiếp theo. Do đó, các chính sách có ý định tốt có thể dẫn đến những tác động phản tác dụng tổng thể bằng cách cho phép mọi người hành động xấu trong các hành vi liên quan. Mặt khác, lý thuyết chen lấn động lực cho rằng việc hạn chế mọi người thực hiện hành vi mong muốn có thể phản tác dụng. Chúng tôi sử dụng một thí nghiệm trong lớp học để kiểm tra xem một khuôn khổ điều tiết nhằm khuyến khích cá nhân thực hiện hành vi thân thiện với môi trường có tạo ra các tác động tương tự về hiệu ứng cấp phép như một khuôn khổ không điều tiết hay không. Chúng tôi cho thấy cách thức hành động tốt được thực hiện dường như không ảnh hưởng đến hiệu ứng cấp phép. Tuy nhiên, chúng tôi phát hiện rằng những sinh viên theo chuyên ngành kinh doanh và môi trường phản ứng không tốt với khuôn khổ điều tiết. Chúng tôi cũng chỉ ra rằng sinh viên chuyên ngành môi trường có động lực nội tại cao hơn so với những sinh viên chuyên ngành kinh doanh. Do đó, chúng tôi đề xuất rằng hiệu ứng cấp phép có khả năng xảy ra hơn khi hành động ‘tốt đẹp’ trước đó được lựa chọn tự do (so với việc do điều tiết gây ra) đối với những cá nhân không có động lực nội tại (so với động lực nội tại).
Từ khóa
Tài liệu tham khảo
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