Do firms benefit from multiple banking relationships? Evidence from small and medium- sized firms in Japan

Masayo Shikimi1
1Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hiroshima University, Higashisenda 1-1-89, Naka-ward, Hiroshima City, Hiroshima, 730-0053, Japan

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