Liệu những suy thoái kinh tế dự kiến có tiêu diệt chu kỳ ngân sách chính trị?

The Review of International Organizations - Tập 16 - Trang 817-841 - 2020
Frank Bohn1,2, Jan-Egbert Sturm3,4
1Institute for Management Research, Department of Economics, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
2KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Zurich, Switzerland
3KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
4CESifo Munich, Germany

Tóm tắt

Tài liệu về chu kỳ ngân sách chính trị (PBC) lập luận rằng chính phủ mở rộng thâm hụt trong những năm bầu cử. Tuy nhiên, điều gì sẽ xảy ra khi một suy thoái kinh tế được dự kiến? Chính phủ sẽ cho phép thâm hụt mở rộng còn hơn nữa, hay sẽ áp dụng các biện pháp cắt giảm chi tiêu và tăng thuế? Khi cử tri kỳ vọng rằng mức độ ổn định tự động không đầy đủ, mô hình của chúng tôi cho thấy hành vi cơ hội của chính phủ dẫn đến thâm hụt nhỏ hơn, từ đó phản ứng theo chu kỳ đối với các suy thoái kinh tế dự kiến. Bằng chứng dữ liệu bảng cho 74 nền dân chủ trong giai đoạn 2000-2016 hỗ trợ mạnh mẽ cho dự đoán lý thuyết về tính tuần hoàn. Hơn nữa, các suy thoái dự kiến vẫn giữ được ý nghĩa khi các hiệu ứng PBC điều kiện ngữ cảnh khác được đưa vào phân tích thực nghiệm.

Từ khóa

#chu kỳ ngân sách chính trị #thâm hụt #suy thoái kinh tế #phản ứng theo chu kỳ #ổn định tự động

Tài liệu tham khảo

Aidt, T.S., & Mooney, G. (2014). Voting suffrage and the political budget cycle: Evidence from the london metropolitan boroughs 1902-1937. Journal of Public Economics, 112, 53–71. Akhmedov, A., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2004). Opportunistic political cycles: Test in a young democracy setting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4), 1301–1338. Aldenhoff, F.-O. (2007). Are economic forecasts of the international monetary fund politically biased? a public choice analysis. The Review of International Organizations, 2(3), 239–260. Alesina, A., Cohen, G.D., & Roubini, N. (1992). Macroeconomic policy and elections in oecd democracies. Economics and Politics, 4, 1–30. Alesina, A., Cohen, G.D., & Roubini, N. (1993). Electoral business cycles in industrial democracies. European Journal of Political Economy, 9, 1–25. Alesina, A., Perotti, R., & Tavares, J. (1998). The political economy of fiscal adjustments. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 29(1), 197–266. Alesina, A., & Roubini, N. (1990). Political cycles in OECD economies. Review of Economic Studies, 59, 663–688. Alt, J.E., & Lassen, D.D. (2006a). Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries. European Economic Review, 50(6), 1403–1439. Alt, J.E., & Lassen, D.D. (2006b). Transparency, political polarization, and political budget cycles in oecd countries. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 530–550. Alt, J.E., & Rose, S. (2007). Context-conditional political budget cycles, IN: Boix, C., StokesS, C., The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, Oxford University Press, New York. Arifin, T., & Purnomowati, N.H. (2017). Government expenditure, political cycle & rent-seeking. International Journal of Business and Society, 18 (3), 461–468. Atoyan, R., & Conway, P. (2011). Projecting macroeconomic outcomes: Evidence from the IMF. The Review of International Organizations, 6(3-4), 415–441. Auerbach, A.J., & Gorodnichenko, Y. (2012). Measuring the output responses to fiscal policy. American Economic Journal:, Economic Policy, 4(2), 1–27. Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., & Walsh, P. (2001). New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions. World Bank Economic Review, 15, 165–176. [Dataset downloadable at: http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40]. Benito, B., Bastida, F., & Vicente, C. (2013). Municipal elections and cultural expenditure. Journal of Cultural Economics, 37(1), 3–32. Bjørnskov, C., & Rode, M. (2020). Regime types and regime change : A new dataset on democracy, coups, and political institutions. The Review of International Organizations, 15, 531–551. Block, S.A. (2002). Political business cycles, democratization, and economic reform: The case of Africa. Journal of Development Economics, 67(1), 205–28. Bohn, F. (2018). Political cycles: beyond rational expectations. PlosONE, 13(10), 1–23. Bohn, F. (2019). Political budget cycles, incumbency advantage and propaganda. Economics and Politics, 31(1), 43–70. Bohn, F., & Veiga, F.J. (2019a). Elections, recession expectations and excessive debt: an unholy trinity. Public Choice, 31(3–4), 429–449. Bohn, F., & Veiga, F.J. (2019b). Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions. Economic Inquiry, 57(4), 2058–2081. Bojar, A. (2017). Do political budget cycles work? a micro-level investigation of pre-electoral budgeting and its electoral consequences. Electoral Studies, 45, 29–43. Brambor, T., Clark, W., & Golder, M. (2006). Understanding interaction models: improving empirical analysis. Political Analysis, 14, 63–82. Brender, A. (2003). The effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in israel: 1989-1998. Journal of Public Economics, 87(9-10), 2187–2205. Brender, A., & Drazen, A. (2005). Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(7), 1271–1295. Brender, A., & Drazen, A. (2008). How do budget deficits and economic growth affect reelection prospects? evidence from a large panel of countries. American Economic Review, 98(5), 2203–2220. Castro, V., & Martins, R. (2016). Are there political cycles hidden inside government expenditures?. Applied Economics Letters, 23(1), 34–37. Chang, C.P., & Lee, C.C. (2010). Us macroeconomic conditions and asymmetric adjustment to presidential approval. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 13(3), 251–258. Chang, E.C.C. (2008). Electoral incentives and budgetary spending: Rethinking the role of political institutions. The Journal of Politics, 70(4), 1086–1097. Cheibub, J.A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J.R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice, 143(1-2), 67–101. Cruz, C., Keefer, P., & Scartascini, C. (2018). Database of political institutions 2017 (dpi2017), unpublished manuscript [Inter-American Development Bank, dataset downloadable at: . https://mydata.iadb.org/Reform-Modernization-of-the-State/Database-of-Political-Institutions-2017/938i-s2bw]. De Haan, J., & Klomp, J. (2013). Conditional political budget cycles:, a review of recent evidence. Public Choice, 157(3-4), 387–410. De Haan, J., Sturm, J.E., & Beekhuis, G. (1999). The weak government thesis: some new evidence. Public Choice, 101, 163–176. Drazen, A. (2001). The political business cycle after 25 years. In Bernanke, B.S., & Rogoff, K. (Eds.) NBER macroeconomics annual 2000, (Vol. 15 pp. 5–117). Cambridge: MIT Press. Drazen, A., & Eslava, M. (2010). Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 92 (1), 39–52. Dreher, A., Marchesi, S., & Vreeland, J.R. (2008). The political economy of IMF forecasts. Public Choice, 137(1-2), 145–171. Dreher, A. (2006). Does globalization affect growth? evidence from a new index of globalization. Applied Economics, 38(10), 1091–1110. Dubois, E. (2016). Political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus. Public Choice, 166, 235–259. Franzese, R.J. Jr. (2002). Electoral and partisan cycles in economic policies and outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science, 5, 369–421. Goulas, E., Kallandranis, C., & Zervoyianni, A. (2015). Economic Outcomes and Voting Behavior: Evidence from Greece, Regent’s Working Papers in Business & Management 1506. Gupta, S., Liu, E.X., & Mulas-Granados, C. (2015). Now or later? the political economy of public investment in democracies?. European Journal of Political Economy, 101, 101–114. Gygli, S., Haelg, F., Potrafke, N., & Sturm, J.E. (2019). The KOF Globalisation Index - revisited. Review of International Organizations, 14(3), 543–574. Hainmueller, J., Mummolo, J., & Xu, Y. (2019). How much should we trust estimates from multiplicative interaction models? Simple tools to improve empirical practice. Political Analysis, 27(2), 163–192. Hayo, B., & Neumeier, F. (2016). Political leaders’ socioeconomic background and public budget deficits: Evidence from OECD countries. Economics and Politics, 28(1), 55–78. Iglewicz, B., & Hoaglin, D.C. (1993). How to Detect and Handle Outliers, volume 16 of The ASQC Basic References in Quality Control: Statistical Techniques, ASQC Quality Press. Ilzetzki, E., Mendoza, E.G., & Vegh, C.A. (2013). How big (small?) are fiscal multipliers? Journal of Monetary Economics, 60, 239–254. Katsimi, M., & Sarantides, V. (2012). Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies?. Public Choice, 151, 325–362. Klomp, J., & De Haan, J. (2016). Election cycles in natural resource rents: Empirical evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 121, 79–93. Lewis-Beck, M.S., & Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science, 3(1), 183–219. Peltzman, S. (1992). Voters as fiscal conservatives. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 327–361. Rasmussen Reports. (2010). Americans reject Keynesian economics, unpublished manuscript [Rasmussen Reports]. Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review, 80(1), 21–36. Roubini, N., & Sachs, J.D. (1989). Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies. European Economic Review, 33 (5), 903–933. Schneider, C.J. (2010). Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: political budget cycles in the West German states. Public Choice, 142, 125–150. Schuknecht, L. (1996). Political business cycles and fiscal policies in developing countries. Kyklos, 49(2), 155–170. Schuknecht, L. (2000). Fiscal policy cycles and public expenditure in developing countries. Public Choice, 102(1-2), 115–1300. Seidman, L.S. (2015). Automatic Fiscal Policies to Combat Recessions, Abingdon. New York: Routledge. Shi, M., & Svensson, J. (2006). Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?. Journal of Public Economics, 90(8-9), 1367–1389. Sims, C.A. (2003). Implications of rational inattention. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(3), 665–690. Streb, J.M., Lema, D., & Torrens, G. (2009). Checks and balances on political budget cycles:, Cross-country evidence. Kyklos, 62(3), 426–447. Veiga, F.J., Veiga, L.G., & Morozumi, A. (2017). Political budget cycles and media freedom. Electoral Studies, 45, 88–99. Veiga, L.G., & Veiga, F.J. (2007). Does opportunism pay off. Economics Letters, 96, 177–182. Vergne, C. (2009). Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1), 63–77.