Do credit unions use their tax advantage to benefit members? Evidence from a cost function

Review of Financial Economics - Tập 12 - Trang 35-47 - 2003
W Scott Frame1, Gordon V Karels2, Christine A McClatchey3
1Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, GA 30309, USA
2Department of Finance, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588-040, USA
3Department of Finance, University of Northern Colorado, Greeley, CO 80639, USA

Tóm tắt

AbstractThis paper examines whether the credit union income tax subsidy is passed along to members or consumed by managers. To that end, we estimate a translog cost function for credit unions and mutual thrifts that is tailored to the unique objectives of mutually owned depository institutions. We find that credit unions with residential common bonds have higher costs than mutual thrifts, but single common bond occupational and associational credit unions are more cost efficient. Thus, it appears that residential credit unions engage in expense preference behavior and hence redirect some portion of their tax benefit away from members.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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Review of Financial Economics

Tập 12

35-47

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