Do Conventions Need to Be Common Knowledge?

Aumann R (1976) Agreeing to disagree. Ann Stat 4:1236–1239

Binmore K (1987) Modeling rational players I. Econ Phil 3:9–55

Binmore K (1994) Playing fair: game theory and the social contract I. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

Binmore K (2005) Natural justice. Oxford University Press, New York

Binmore K (2007) Does game theory work? The bargaining challenge. MIT Press, Cambridge MA

Binmore K (2007) Playing for real. Oxford University Press, New York

Binmore K, Samuelson L (2001) Coordinated action in the electronic mail game. Games Econ Behav 35:6–30

Binmore K, Swierzbinski J, Hsu S, Proulx C (1993) Focal points and bargaining. Int J Game Theory 22:381–409

Cubitt R, Sugden R (2005) Common reasoning in game theory: a resolution of the paradoxes of ‘common knowledge of rationality’. Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics 17, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Halpern JY (1987) Using reasoning about knowledge to analyse distributed systems. Annu Rev Comp Sci 2:37–68

Harsanyi J (1977) Rational behavior and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Hume, D (1978) A treatise of human nature, 2nd edn. Clarendon Press, Oxford (edited by Selby-Bigge LA, revised by Nidditch P, first published 1739)

Kalai E, Smorodinsky M (1975) Other solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem. Econometrica 45:1623–1630

Lewis D (1969) Convention: a philosophical study. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

Maynard Smith J (1982) Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Monderer D, Samet D (1989) Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs. Games Econ Behav 1:170–190

Myerson R (1991) Game theory: analysis of conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

Nash J (1950) The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18:155–162

Nash J (1951) Non-cooperative games. Ann Math 54:286–295

Rawls J (1972) A theory of justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Rousseau J-J (1913) The inequality of man. In: Cole G (ed) Rousseau’s social contract and discourses. Dent, London

Rubinstein A (1989) The electronic mail game: strategic behavior under almost common knowledge. Am Econ Rev 70:385–391

Schelling T (1960) The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA

Skyrms B (1996) Evolution of the social contract. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Skyrms B (2003) The stag hunt and the evolution of the social structure. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Turnbull C (1972) The mountain people. Touchstone, New York

Von Neumann J, Morgenstern O (1944) The theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton