Divide and Invest: Bargaining in a Dynamic Framework

Homo Oeconomicus - Tập 37 Số 1-2 - Trang 121-153 - 2020
Francesca Flamini1
1Economics, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

Tóm tắt

AbstractMany negotiations (for instance, among political parties or partners in a business) are characterized by dynamic bargaining: current agreements affect future bargaining possibilities. We study such situations using bargaining games á la Rubinstein (Econometrica 50:97–109, 1982), with the novelty that players can decide how much to invest, as well as how to share the residual surplus for their own consumption. Their investment decisions affect the size of the next surplus. In line with the existing literature, we focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria, where consumption and investment are linear time-invariant functions of capital and show that standard results in bargaining theory can be overturned. For instance, a more patient proposer may consume less than his opponent. The intuition is that when capital is productive, both parties have incentives to invest, however, the most patient party wishes to invest significantly more than his opponent. Then, to prioritize investment—which affects future bargaining possibilities—the former must make larger concessions and let the latter consume more. Another interesting result is that if a player becomes more patient, both parties may reduce their investment. The key underlying driver of this result is that when counteroffers become cheaper for an impatient party, he is able to reduce his investment and consume more. This forces his opponent to make larger concessions (and reduce his investment plan). Moreover, extreme demands (where a player consumes all the residual surplus) are possible in equilibrium, under fairly modest assumptions. Finally, only when bargaining is frictionless, is the equilibrium efficient.

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Homo Oeconomicus

Tập 37 Số 1-2

121-153

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