Did the legalization of abortion increase women’s household bargaining power? Evidence from labor supply

Angrist, J., & Evans, W. (1999). Schooling and labor market consequences of the 1970 state abortion reforms. Research in Labor Economics, 18, 75–114.

Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). How much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 249–275.

Blau, F. (1998). Trends in the well-being of American Women, 1970–1995. Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 112–165.

Blundell, R., Chiappori, P.-A., Magnac, T., & Meghir, C. (2002). Collective labor supply: Heterogeneity and nonparticipation. Mimeo, UCL.

Blundell, R., & MaCurdy, T. (1999). Labor supply: A review of alternative approaches. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 1559–1695.

Chiappori, P.-A. (1992). Collective labor supply and welfare. Journal of Political Economy, 100, 437–467.

Chiappori, P.-A., Fortin, B., & Lacroix, G. (2002). Household labor supply, sharing rule and the marriage market. Journal of Political Economy, 110(1), 37–72.

Chiappori, P.-A., & Oreffice, S. (2006). Birth control and female empowerment: An equilibrium analysis. Mimeo, Columbia University and Clemson University.

Choo, E., & Siow, A. (2006). Who marries whom and why. Journal of Political Economy, 114, 175–201.

Donni, O. (2005). Collective female labor supply: Theory and application. IZA discussion paper # 1506.

Eissa, N., & Liebman, J. (1996). Labor supply response to the Earned Income Tax Credit. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(2), 605–637.

Friedberg, L. (1998). Did unilateral divorce raise divorce rates? Evidence from panel data. American Economic Review, 88, 608–627.

Glendon, M. (1987). Abortion and divorce in Western Law. Harvard University Press.

Goldin, C., & Katz, L. (2002). The power of the pill: Oral contraceptives and women’s career and marriage decisions. Journal of Political Economy, 110(4), 730–770.

Goldin, C., & Katz, L. (2000). Career and marriage in the age of the pill. American Economic Review, 90(2), 461–465.

Gray, J. S. (1998). Divorce-law changes, household bargaining, and married women’s labor supply. American Economic Review, 88, 628–642.

Grossbard, S. (2005). Women’s labor supply, marriage and welfare dependency. Labour, 19, 211–241.

Grossbard-Shechtman, S. (1993). On the economics of marriage. A theory of marriage, labor and divorce. Westview Press.

Grossbard-Shechtman, A. (1984). A theory of allocation of time in markets for labour and marriage. Economic Journal, 94, 863–882.

Gruber, J. (1994). The incidence of mandated maternity benefits. American Economic Review, 84(3), 622–641.

Heer, D., & Grossbard-Shechtman, A. (1981). The impact of the female marriage squeeze and the contraceptive revolution on sex roles and the women’s liberalization movements in the United States,1960 to 1975. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 43(1), 49–65.

Héritier, F. (2002). Masculin/Féminin II. Odile Jacob.

Johnson, W., & Skinner, J. (1986). Labor supply and marital separation. American Economic Review, 76(3), 455–469.

Jones, R., Darroch, J., & Henshaw, S. (2002). Contraceptive use among US women having abortions in 2000–2001. Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health, 34(6), 294–303.

Juhn, C., & Kim, D. (1999). The effects of rising female labor supply on male wages. Journal of Labor Economics, 17(1), 23–48.

Kooreman, P., & Kapteyn, A. (1986). Estimation of rationed and unrationed household labor supply functions using flexible functional forms. Economic Journal, 96, 308–322.

Lehrer, E. (1995). The effects of religion on the labor supply of married women. Social Science Research, 24, 281–301.

Levine, P., Staiger D., Kane, T., & Zimmerman D. (1999). Roe vs. Wade and American fertility. American Journal of Public Health, 89(2), 199–203.

Levitt, S., & Donohue, J. III. (2001). The impact of legalized abortion on crime. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2), 379–420.

Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. (1996). Bargaining and distribution in marriage. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(4), 139–158.

Mazzocco, M. (2007). Household intertemporal behavior: A collective characterization and a test of commitment. Review of Economic Studies. (Forthcoming).

Merz, J. F., Jackson, C. A., & Klerman, J. A. (1996). A review of abortion policy: legality, Medicaid funding, and parental involvement, 1967–1994. RAND 96-24.

Moffitt, R. (1992). Incentive effects of the US welfare system: A review. Journal of Economic Literature, 30(1), 1–61.

Mroz, M. (1987). The sensitivity of an empirical model of married women’s hours of work to economic and statistical assumptions. Econometrica, 55, 765–799.

Pakter, J., O’Hare, D., Nelson, F., & Svigir, M. (1973). Two years experience in New York City with the liberalized abortion law. Progress and problems. American Journal of Public Health, 63(6), 524–535.

Ransom, M. (1987). An empirical model of discrete and continuous choice in family labor supply. Review of Economics and Statistics, 59, 465–472.

Shapiro, D., & Shaw, L. (1983). Growth in the labor force attachment of married women: Accounting for changes in the 1970s. Southern Economic Journal, 50, 461–473.

Thomas, D. (1990). Intra-household resource allocation: An inferential approach. Journal of Human Resources, 25, 635–664.

Vermeulen, F. (2002). Collective household models: Principles and main results. Journal of Economic Surveys, 16(4), 533–564.