Determinants of post-congressional lobbying employment

Anderson S (2009) Revisiting adjusted ADA scores for the U.S. Congress, 1947–2007. Polit Anal 17(1):83–88

Austen-Smith D (1995) Campaign contributions and access. Am Polit Sci Rev 89(3):566–581

Austen-Smith D, Wright J (1994) Counteractive lobbying. Am J Polit Sci 38(1):25–44

Bauer R, Pool I, Dexter L (1963) American business and public policy: the politics of foreign trade. Atherton Press, New York

Bertrand M, Bombardini M, Trebbi F (2011) Is it whom you know or what you know? An empirical assessment of the lobbying process. NBER Working Paper No 16765

Blanes i Vidal J, Draca M, Fons-Rosen C (2010) Revolving door lobbyists. Manuscript, London School of Economics and Political Science

Blinder A (1973) Wage discrimination: reduced form and structural variables. J Hum Resour 8(4):436–455

Borders R, Dockery C (1995) Beyond the hill: a directory of Congress from 1984 to 1993: where have all the members gone? University Press of America, Lanham

Butler D, Sovey A (2010) Do lobbying firms target legislators key to the legislative process? Evidence from the revolving door. Yale University, Manuscript

Cohen J (1986) The dynamics of the “Revolving Door” on the FCC. Am J Polit Sci 30(4):689–708

Diermeier D, Keane M, Merlo A (2005) A political economy model of congressional careers. Am Econ Rev 95(1):347–373

Fowler J (2006) Connecting the Congress: a study of cosponsorship networks. Polit Anal 14(4):456–487

Gely R, Zardkoohi A (2001) Measuring the effects of post-government employment restrictions. Am Law Econ Rev 3(2):288–301

Gormley W (1979) A test of the revolving door hypothesis at the FCC. Am J Polit Sci 23(4):665–683

Grier K (1991) Congressional influence on U.S. monetary policy: an Eempirical test. J Monet Econ 28(2):201–220

Groseclose T, Krehbiel K (1994) Golden parachutes, rubber checks, and strategic retirements from the 102nd house. Am J Polit Sci 38(1):75–99

Groseclose T, Levitt S, Snyder J (1999) Comparing interest group scores across time and chambers: adjusted ADA score for the U.S. Congress. Am Polit Sci Rev 93(1):33–50

Hall R, van Houweling R (1995) Avarice and ambition in Congress: representatives’ decisions to run or retire from the U.S. house. Am Polit Sci Rev 89(1):121–136

Heckman J (1979) Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica 47(1):153–161

Herrick R, Nixon D (1996) Is there life after congress? Patterns and determinants of post-congressional careers. Legis Stud Q 21(4):489–499

Idson T, Feaster D (1990) A selectivity model of employer-size wage differentials. J Labor Econ 8(1):99–122

Jann B (2008) The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for linear regression models. Stata J 8(4):453–479

Kiewiet DR, Zeng L (1993) An analysis of congressional career decisions, 1947–1986. Am Polit Sci Rev 87(4):928–941

Leal D (2002) Home is where the heart is: congressional tenure, retirement, and the implications for representation. Am Polit Res 30(3):265–284

Milbrath L (1963) The Washington lobbyists. Rand McNally, Chicago

Milyo J, Groseclose T (1999) The electoral effects of incumbent wealth. J Law Econ 42(2):699–722

Oaxaca R (1973) Male-female wage differentials in urban labor markets. Int Econ Rev 14(3):693–709

Public Citizen (2005) Congressional revolving doors: the journey from Congress to K street. Public Citizen, Washington, DC

Rubin D, Thomas N (1996) Matching using estimated propensity scores: relating theory to practice. Biometrics 52(1):249–264

Salisbury R, Johnson P, Heinz J, Laumann E, Nelson R (1989) Who you know versus what you know: the uses of government experience for Washington lobbyists. Am J Polit Sci 33(1):175–195

VandeHei J, Juliet E (2003) Targeting lobbyists pays off for GOP. Washington Post, June 26, 2003

Weingast B, Moran M (1983) Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission. J Polit Econ 91(5):765–800

Zeigler H, Baer M (1968) The recruitment of lobbyists and legislators. Midwest J Polit Sci 12(4):493–513