Delegated expertise—when are good projects bad news?

Economics Letters - Tập 82 - Trang 77-82 - 2004
Eberhard Feess1, Markus Walzl1
1Department of Economics, Aachen University (RWTH), Templergraben 64, D-52062 Aachen, Germany

Tài liệu tham khảo

Demski, 1987, Delegated expertise, Journal of Accounting Research, 25, 68, 10.2307/2491259 Levitt, 1997, Is no news bad news? Information transmission and the role of “early warning” in the principal-agent model, RAND Journal of Economics, 28, 641, 10.2307/2555780 Lewis, 1997, Information management in incentive problems, Journal of Political Economy, 105, 796, 10.1086/262094
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Economics Letters

Tập 82

77-82

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