Credit rationing, implicit contracts, risk aversion, and the variability of interest rates

Journal of Macroeconomics - Tập 14 - Trang 337-347 - 1992
Nilss Olekalns1,2
1La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, Australia
2The University of Canberra Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia

Tài liệu tham khảo

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