Credible Collusion in Spatially Separated Markets*

International Economic Review - Tập 44 Số 1 - Trang 299-312 - 2003
John E. Gross1,2, William L. Holahan3
1Econweb and Duke University
2University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee and University of Birmingham
3University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and University of Birmingham

Tóm tắt

In an infinitely repeated game, sellers employ a trigger strategy of mutual forbearance from invasion of each other's markets, stabilized against invasion by the threat of Bertrand pricing. Contrary to conventional static models, this article shows stability for a wide range of transportation costs and present value parameters, and that increases in transportation costs tend to destabilize the collusive agreement.

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Tài liệu tham khảo

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International Economic Review

Tập 44 Số 1

299-312

Thông tin tác giả