Cost-efficient Performance-Vesting Equity

Economics Letters - Tập 182 - Trang 37-39 - 2019
Rodion Skovoroda1, Alistair Bruce2, Trevor Buck3, Ian Gregory-Smith4
1Nottingham University Business School, The University of Nottingham, Jubilee Campus, Nottingham, NG8 1BB, UK
2Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University, 50 Shakespeare St, Nottingham, NG1 4FQ, UK
3Adam Smith Business School, Glasgow University, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK
4Department of Economics, The University of Sheffield, Sheffield, 9 Mappin Street, S1 4DT, UK

Tài liệu tham khảo

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