Corporate Governance and Competitive Advantage in Family–Controlled Firms
Tóm tắt
Recent attempts to identify the basis of family–controlled firms’ competitive advantage have drawn upon the resource–based view of the firm. This article supplements these efforts and advances the argument that family–controlled firms’ competitive advantage arises from their system of corporate governance. Systems of corporate governance embody incentives, authority patterns, and norms of legitimation that generate particular organizational propensities to create competitive advantages and disadvantages. For comparative purposes, the characteristics of managerial, alliance, and family governance are reviewed. The impact of a family's control rights over a firm's assets generates three dominant propensities (parsimony, personalism, and particularism). These propensities give advantages in scarce environments, facilitate the creation and utilization of social capital, and engender opportunistic investment processes. The experience of family–controlled firms in emerging markets is drawn upon to illustrate the argument.
Từ khóa
Tài liệu tham khảo
Alchian A.A., 1972, American Economic Review, 62, 777
Chamberlin E.H., 1933, The theory of monopolistic competition: A re–orientation of the theory of value
Chandler A.D., 1997, Fundamental issues in strategy: A research agenda, pp. 323
Davis K., 2001, Law and Politics in International Business, 32, 331
Fukuyama F., 1995, Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity
Granovetter M., 1994, The handbook of economic sociology, pp. 453
Hagen J.M., 1998, Academy of Management Journal, 23, 589
Jensen M.C., 1989, Harvard Business Review, 67, 61
Kerr C., 1960, Industrialism and industrial man; the problems of labor and management in economic growth
Khanna T., 1997, Harvard Business Review, 75, 41
Mintzberg H., 1994, The rise and fall of strategic planning
Morck R., 1988, Journal of Financial Economics, 79, 842
Porter M.E., 1985, Competitive advantage
Porter M.E., 1998, On competition, pp. 431
Rajan R.G., 2001, The great reversals: The politics of financial development in the 20th century
Schumpeter J.A., 1934, Theory of economic development
Useem M., 1993, Executive defense: Shareholder power and corporate reorganization
Weber M., 1947, The theory of social and economic organization
Williamson O.E., 1985, The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting
Williamson P.J., 1997, Harvard Business Review, 75, 55