Control via concentration?: Political and business evidence
Tóm tắt
This paper explores the relationship between concentration and control, in terms of both markets and hierarchies in economics and their analogues of polities and parties in politics. It is argued that the relationship is not always a positive one. In some cases the relationship is negative and in other cases there is no relationship at all. Insight into the determinants of the nature of this relationship can be gained by explaining apparent inconsistencies which appear when contrasting the economic and political spheres. For example, why is it that a market which meets the criteria for perfect competition—many small producers—is considered socially optimal but not so a polity comprised of many small parties? The two-party system, considered desirable in our national politics, corresponds to the much maligned duopoly in the economic sphere. This paper posits that there are three major types of systems found in both the economic and political spheres, which apply to both levels of aggregation—firms and markets, and parties and polities, respectively—and which have different implications for the relationship between concentration and control. It is also argued that these two levels of aggregation, however useful or necessary for purposes of discussion, are not analytically distinct.
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