Contractual arrangements and enforcement in transition agriculture: Theory and evidence from China

Food Policy - Tập 33 - Trang 570-575 - 2008
Hongdong Guo1, Robert W. Jolly2
1Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province 310029, PR China
2Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011, USA

Tài liệu tham khảo

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