Congressional rationality and spatial voting
Tóm tắt
It is very difficult to demonstrate that representatives employ sophisticated cost-benefit calculations in evaluating constituent benefits when making many legislative decisions. This is because most modern American legislation is ambiguous about which constituencies will receive particularized benefits. This paper examines a series of locational rollcall votes in which the benefits going to constituents were obvious. In such cases representatives balance increases in voter support within their congressional districts and potential increases in their political power within Congress to be gained by vote trading. If constituency benefits are great, representatives overwhelmingly support legislation to provide such benefits. As the benefits decline, vote trading increases.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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